Blog: Climate Change and Conflict

The opinions expressed in this blog series are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Climate Counsel as a whole.

Cambodia - authoritarian development and its costs

08.10.2024

Asia Scott (Climate Counsel Researcher)

This is the sixth blog in a series covering climate security. In this series we investigate the role of climate change as a causative factor and threat-multiplier in conflict, and the natural environment as a victim of conflict.

Cambodia is a predominantly agrarian society, with 78% of the population living in rural areas (Land Links). Yet despite this figure, one in five families no longer have their own land from which to live off (Welthungerhilfe). Mass land expropriations have been ongoing since the 1990s in the name of modernisation of agriculture. A programme of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs), which are land leases granted by the government to private companies, has allowed powerful business interests to clear land of people and forests. Through ELCs, many have lost their homes and livelihoods, with the environment and indigenous communities suffering greatly as a result of government greed and failed policies.

Between 2000 and 2023, 170,842 households were affected by government driven land grabbing (Equal Times). Countless families returned to their land to find crops cleared (Welthungerhilfe), and many are now forced to pay rent in order to farm land which was once theirs (Equal Times). Land was often used to grow agricultural exports such as rubber and sugar cane (OpenDevelopment Cambodia), resulting in mass deforestation, changing weather patterns and increased CO2 emissions (Earth Journalism Network). In May 2012, the government declared a moratorium on the granting of new ELCs, however, ELCs still control roughly 14% of the country’s landmass (Mongabay).

Ecological Impacts

ELCs have been one of the main drivers behind the mass deforestation in Cambodia, contributing to an estimated 40% of deforestation (WWF; Mongabay). According to Global Forest Watch’s satellite data, Cambodia has lost almost 2.5 million hectares of forest in the last twenty years (Earth Journalism Network). It has also been found that 104 ELCs overlap or are in the heart of 23 protected areas across the country, allowing for illegal logging and destruction of protected species and habitats (Mongabay).

The effects of massive deforestation are already becoming evident in Cambodia. There has been an increase in droughts due to longer and hotter dry seasons, as the shrinking forest can no longer regulate local weather patterns and water flows (Earth Journalism Network). There has also been a steep rise in CO2 emissions, from 11 million tonnes in 2001 to 59 million tonnes in 2020, in part due to deforestation. Despite these alarming figures, Cambodia is one of just 64 countries that did not sign the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forestation and Land Use during the COP26 climate talks (VOD), suggesting the Cambodian government, as of yet, is not interested in real progress on environmental protection.

Human Rights Ignored

Indigenous communities make up 2-3% of the population (around 400,000 people), with the majority living in remote areas of Cambodia (New Mandala). Much of the land these communities lived on and farmed for generations was granted to private companies as ELCs, used not only for agricultural projects, but also for extractive processes and illegal logging (New Mandala). This lead to forced displacement of many communities, as well as the destruction of ancestral lands and the related cultures and traditions.

Since 2009, communities have been able to, in theory, reclaim lost land, but this is a long and expensive process which many are simply unable to undertake. In October 2023, 470 indigenous families were rejected in their attempt to reclaim their land which was taken by an ELC, with authorities denying them access to the now vacant land (Mongabay). Hectares of land, formerly used in ELCs, now lie dead. Yet the government is reluctant to return land to indigenous communities, denying indigenous rights to the land, and preventing any attempts at rewilding or reforestation. It is those indigenous to the land, with generational knowledge, who are best placed to salvage it.

Persecution of Activists

Until a government ban in 2020, there were community patrols in Preah Roka and Prey Lang, alongside Ministry of Environment rangers, to find and arrest those involved in illegal logging. Despite this ban, many groups continue to patrol illegally to protect the forests they value so highly. One community patrol member told Mongabay that he believed there was an increase in illegal logging in Preah Roka and Prey Lang following the 2020 ban, and estimated that around 40% of Preah Roka was illegally felled between 2020 and 2023 (Mongabay). To worsen the situation further, police and rangers now actively target activists and are known to take bribes from illegal loggers (Mongabay).

There is decreasing space for civil society and peaceful protest, particularly when it concerns illicit government activities. Still, this has not deterred those trying to protect the environment in Cambodia and expose the government’s role in its destruction. In May 2024, 10 activists from the group Mother Nature Cambodia were tried at Phnom Penh Capital Court on charges of “insulting the King” and “plotting” (Amnesty International). All activists were found guilty and sentenced to six to eight years imprisonment, with three also receiving a KHR 10,000,000 (about £1,800) fine. The charges are based on the group’s peaceful protests and environmental activism, aimed at bringing awareness to government corruption and environmental degradation.

In 2014 Climate Counsel’s Richard J Rogers filed a Communication (through Global Diligence) to the Prosecutor of the ICC asserting that crimes associated with mass land grabbing and resource exploitation amounted to crimes against humanity under international law (Climate Counsel; Global Diligence). Following the Communication, in 2020 the European Union suspended Cambodia’s duty-free access to the EU market for certain products (for example, sugar), due to systematic human rights violations (Equal Times). While this may be a step in the right direction, it is imperative that the international community take concrete steps to prevent further deterioration of the environmental and human rights situations in Cambodia.

Conclusion

Land grabbing has left scars across Cambodia, from forced displacements of indigenous communities to mass deforestation. The government has continued to promote development and modernisation of agriculture at the expense of people and wildlife, all the while ensuring the elites continue to profit. The censorship of activists prevents the regime being held accountable and highlights a disregard for the precarious situation the government has created. Although the international community has at times expressed criticism, more must be done to ensure the protection of indigenous peoples and the rich ecology of Cambodia.

‘Hydropolitics’ and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

13.09.2023

Cameron Seeley (Climate Counsel Researcher)

This is the fifth blog in a series covering climate security. In this series we investigate the role of climate change as a causative factor and threat-multiplier in conflict, and the natural environment as a victim of conflict.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the most water scarce region in the world. Groundwater, which provides approximately half the world’s drinking water, is of particular importance.

Access to water has inevitably become a contentious political issue between neighbouring states given approximately 90% of such resources cross one or more international borders. Nowhere is this more true than in the enduring conflict between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), both of which are sustained by aquifers (underground layers of water bearing rock).

Political control over water, otherwise referred to as ‘hydropolitics’, has been and remains one of the most difficult hurdles to overcome in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Israeli government water policies have helped drive poverty and strengthened the support base of militant groups they oppose. With tensions between the pair reaching seemingly new heights on a yearly basis, the water issue continues to come under increased scrutiny. As such, this blog aims to understand how access to water continues to be a securitised issue, and how climate change threatens to exacerbate the conflict.

Gaza’s undrinkable water

The right to water is enshrined in international law, under which Israel, as the occupying power in the OPT, must not only refrain from taking actions that violate this right but take deliberate actions to ensure it is fulfilled. Israel’s deprivation of Palestinian access to sufficient water for basic needs, by contrast, has been the focus of two critical reports published by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW). Palestinian human rights group Al Haq refers to Israel’s practices as ‘water apartheid’.

The Coastal aquifer and the Mountain aquifer, along with the Jordan river basin, are both Israel’s and the Palestinians’ three main water sources. Palestinian access to all three is limited by Israel as per the 1995 Oslo II Accord, which granted the state  control over all water resources and the right to utilise 80% of their output.

The Gaza strip today is home to over 2 million residents, ranking as one of the most densely populated areas in the world, and is often referred to as the world’s largest open-air prison by humanitarian organisations. The population is under constant surveillance from Israeli authorities, who tightly control the movement of goods in and out of their walls. Control over water plays a key role in maintaining this order.

Israel’s aerial bombing campaigns in the Gaza strip, most notably in 2008-9, 2012, 2014, 2021, 2022, and 2023 destroyed significant amounts of water-related infrastructure. Rebuilding processes are often delayed for months if not years as a result of Israeli security concerns.

The main water source for those in Gaza, the Coastal aquifer, has become practically unusable. Extracted at three times its rate of renewal, increased seawater infiltration has caused salinity levels to rise by an order of magnitude beyond WHO guidelines on safe drinking water. This very same water has increased nitrate levels due to contamination from the untreated sewage of Gaza’s citizens; was responsible for 26% of all reported diseases in Gaza during 2016; and was believed to be the root cause of more than 12% of child deaths in 2018. The construction of a 2021 sensor-equipped underground wall to discourage tunnel digging has exacerbated the issue by further polluting the existing supply, to the point where estimates of the amount of water in the Coastal aquifer believed to be unfit for drinking range from between 95-98%. In 2022, only 10% of Gaza’s population were believed to have access to safe drinking water.

The West Bank’s short supply

The latest estimate on daily per capita water consumption in the West Bank is 82.4 litres, falling to 26 for families not hooked up to the water grid, well below the WHO’s recommendation of 50-100 litres to meet basic needs. Israelis consume approximately 247 litres of water per person with 100% of the population able to access running water, compared to 66.2% of households in the West Bank and 4% in the Gaza strip. Palestinian families that cannot afford to install water tanks and are prohibited from developing their own infrastructure may spend US$10 a month on water.

People in Area C (the 60% of the West Bank fully controlled by Israel) are not supposed to be connected to Israel’s national water pipelines without proof of ownership over their land, but in practice these rules are not applied to Israeli settlers, many of which run successful vineyards and farms. Many of these settlers have been served eviction notices by the Israeli Supreme Court for being on land claimed by Palestinians, but an investigation by the Guardian earlier this year found they remain connected to the state water supply.

Israeli national water carrier Mekorot systematically sinks wells and taps springs to provide water for the 400,000 Israelis in Area C’s illegal settlements. In 2022, four artesian water wells in Area B that were or would have been the main water source for 3,500 Palestinian families were shut off, up from two in the previous four years combined. Authorities maintain strict controls over Palestinian access to the Mountain aquifer and deny access to large parts of the West Bank referred to as ‘closed military areas’, effectively cutting off other sources of water. Palestinian farmers who find themselves unable to grow relatively undemanding crops such as the Jericho banana, reported to be close to extinction by the Washington Post in 2020, have been forced off their land. Israeli territorial expansion, on the other hand, continues to speed up. The frequent seizure of water resources in areas outside Israeli jurisdiction are seen by some as a smokescreen for land grabs.

How climate change threatens to exacerbate the conflict

Israel ranks 27th out of 185 (the lower, the better) on the University of Notre-Dame’s Global Adaptation (ND-GAIN) Country Index, which ranks countries based on their vulnerability and readiness to adapt to the challenges of climate change.

The OPT does not feature on the ND-GAIN index. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), political barriers arising from the policies of the Israeli occupation, rather than a lack of willingness or significant financial and technical challenges, are the main barriers to adaptation. Changing weather patterns in Gaza have caused many of the freshwater sources of the Dead Sea to dry up and its waterline to recede dramatically, both of which have coincided with a rise in extremism and violent clashes with Israeli forces.

Climate change does not merely run the possibility of worsening the security situation in the Israel-Palestine conflict, but has serious implications for the proliferation of violence across the region. MENA is at greater risk of more serious climate impacts than many other regions, with significant increases in the already extremely high average temperatures, increased sea levels, and a change in precipitation patterns all already underway. Many of the countries in the region are amongst the world’s most water stressed. According to the World Bank, they require ‘bold action’ to tackle water scarcity.

Problems are compounded by the need for these countries to supply ever greater amounts of water to their growing populations. According to a 2017 report by the World Bank, 60% of surface water resources in MENA are transboundary, while all countries in the region share at least one aquifer. The appropriate agreements for their management are not in place, difficult to agree, and even more so to implement given the lack of resources, poor governance, and abundance of corruption endemic to much of the region.

Conclusion

Institutions with a mandate to secure international peace and security, such as the International Criminal Court, must begin to acknowledge the role climate change and environmental degradation play in human insecurity. Ignoring the two issues is no longer an option; understanding their intersection in the Israel-Palestine conflict is crucial for planning the next steps in MENA’s peacebuilding process. If global institutions are to remain a relevant force for international stability in the coming decades, they must begin to grapple with these issues now.

Colombia: Conflict, Climate Change, and the Challenges of Peace

22.11.2022

Nicola Fincham (Climate Counsel Researcher)

This is the fourth blog in a series covering climate security. In this series we investigate the role of climate change as a causative factor and threat-multiplier in conflict, and the natural environment as a victim of conflict.

Conflict in Colombia

This blog will discuss the role of Climate Security in decades of internal conflict in Colombia, and in the recent post-conflict era. This piece highlights the cyclical dynamic that climate security can take on, with the environment enabling the very conflict to which it is falling victim.

Colombia has seen half a century of hostilities between its government and the country’s largest rebel movement, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Built out of peasant discontent over unequal land distribution, FARC – a guerrilla army – was formed in 1966 and has been challenging the Colombian government’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force ever since. This conflict has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Colombian citizens, in addition to fracturing state security and stifling economic development; some of Colombia’s economic, social and governance indicators in parts of the country are akin to an emerging middle-income country status, yet these co-exist with levels of poverty and malnutrition on par with standards of some of the least developed regions in the world (CGIAR, 2020). A landmark peace agreement was signed by FARC and the Colombian government in 2016, heralding the guerrilla army’s disarmament. The Colombian government now faces the challenge of post-conflict development.

Environmental Exploitation in Conflict

Ecosystems such as the Amazon, the Andes mountain range, and the eastern plains region make Colombia one of the planet’s most biodiverse countries, rich in water sources and productive soil. But during decades of conflict, natural resources like soil, water, and forests have become spoils of war (The Dialogue, 2017). The main environmental cost of the conflict has been deforestation, the first link in a chain of negative effects that includes loss of biodiversity, soil degradation, and an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. In the absence of effective state control, the conflict with the FARC presented a power vacuum for armed groups to impose their authority, particularly in rural areas. These groups were overwhelmingly funded by illicit economies, such as coca, illegal mining, logging, and wildlife trafficking – all of which depend on the exploitation of natural resources. As decades of conflict unfolded and armed groups grew, severe damage was inflicted on the natural environment as a consequence of their illicit economic pursuits (CNA, 2009).

Environmental exploitation is harmful by nature, but as it financed and sustainied illicit armed groups, it was also central to Colombia’s major internal security threats during the conflict years. The flourishing of illicit businesses under armed groups led to a vicious cycle whereby their territorial control prevented the effective presence of the state and the provision of basic services, rendering civilians ever dependent on local gangs funded through environmental degradation. Whilst the environment did not play a central role in sparking the initial conflict, its exploitation facilitated the long-term strength and power of armed groups in Colombia, fuelling decades of security threats against the Colombian state.

Environment Vulnerable in the Peace Building Process

While peace has been a welcome development for Colombia and the region, there are potentially greater environmental risks posed by the peace-building process itself. The 2016 peace agreement, more than a simple disarmament accord, proposed a profound transformation of the political and social organisation of former conflict zones. Its aim was to integrate all territories within the country under one national policy framework and restore the state’s legitimate monopoly over the use of force (The Dialogue, 2017). Economic development is a worthy and necessary goal of the post-conflict era, with 28% of Colombians living under the national poverty line as of 2020 (CGIAR, 2020). This process could also represent an unprecedented opportunity for sustainable development in Colombia which, if overlooked, will threaten the nation with new climate security threats.  

One of the most important aspects of the peace agreement was the development of rural land reform policies, which encourage displaced people to return to their homes and to boost local economies in underdeveloped rural areas. Land reform is crucial to Colombian development given its stark levels of land inequality, with some 77% of land in the hands of 13% of landowners (CGIAR, 2020). However, as the post-conflict agenda unfolds, it is crucial that policymakers consider the possible environmental impact of these plans, to prevent extreme environmental degradation and to protect against future insecurity and conflict. Colombian environmental activist Fatima Muriel has spoken to UN News this year of the violence already arising from post-conflict development; extractive industries often enter local Colombian territory and when faced with backlash from environmentalists, employ state and non-state security actors to use violence in suppressing these voices (UN News, 2022). Without new specific rules on community participation in environmental law making, Fatima warns, violent conflict will arise between local communities and foreign extractive industries as citizens have no formal mechanisms to resist these developments. Where extractive industries are introduced to newly accessible land, sustainable economic development and security for future generations are threatened (Suarez, Árias-Arévalo and Martínez-Mera, 2018).

Even if established peacefully, development through environmental degradation creates new potential for threatening the peace. For example, soil degradation caused by logging may undermine local food security, whilst water pollution from mercury and other toxins used in illegal mining could spur social conflicts and new internal migrant flows (The Dialogue, 2017). Whilst bringing an end to conflict-driven environmental destruction, therefore, the peace process may pose a meaningful and long-term threat to climate security if its developmental priorities are not complimented by sustainability goals.

Climate Change Complicating Peace Building Process

Climate change and its effects in neighbouring Venezuela have contributed to ongoing environmental destruction and conflict in Colombia throughout the peace-building process. As of March 2021, Colombia has accommodated an estimated 5.5 million refugees fleeing from Venezuela, the majority of whom have migrated since 2015, becoming home to approximately 32% of all Venezuelan migrants in Latin America (The World Bank, 2021). These refugees are fleeing a huge economic contraction, rising insecurity, collapsing public services and a political crackdown in Venezuela. Extreme weather as a result of climate change is now recognised as a growing contributor to Venezuelan’s decisions to leave their homeland, and acts as a barrier to development efforts in Venezuela, thus preventing the return of refugees and pushing more across the border (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2022). Recent news reports increasing deaths due to frequent landslides in northern Venezuela, the latest incident caused by a month’s rain falling in eight hours (Al Jazeera, 2022).

Despite the 2016 peace agreement bringing an end to Colombia’s largest insurgency and mapping out a route to lasting peace, splinter groups (known as ‘dissident’ factions) and other armed bands continue to coerce communities and perpetrate acts of violence throughout large parts of the country (International Crisis Group, 2022). These dissident groups operate largely in rural areas where coca production, illegal mining, and logging in environmentally protected areas fund their activities. Relative peace and post-conflict development efforts offer many Colombian citizens who had previously been vulnerable to coercion by armed groups the opportunity for legitimate alternative employment opportunities. However, Venezuelan refugees remain a key vulnerable subsection of the Colombian population; upon arriving in Colombia, migrants are increasingly pushed out by high urban unemployment to rural areas, where dissident groups exploit their vulnerabilities and employ them under inhumane conditions (International Crisis Group, 2022). The increasing role played by Venezuelans in these illicit economies sustains threats to both the Colombian environment and security, directly connecting climate change and its effects in Venezuela to ongoing security threats in Colombia.

Conclusion

Understanding the environmental components of what happened in Colombia is important for peace-building efforts around the world. If the environment is not recognised as a legitimate victim of conflict, its needs are not addressed in the peace-building process, and further conflict and environmental destruction is perpetuated as a result. The ICC previously investigated war crimes and crimes against humanity in Colombia during the decades of armed conflict between paramilitary groups and the government. Although it was determined that Colombia was not “unable or unwilling” to prosecute and thus an ICC case was not warranted, the environmental components of the conflict may still fall under international criminal jurisdiction.

Fuelling Conflict: The Tatmadaw and the Environment

30.09.22

Nicola Fincham (Climate Counsel Researcher)

This is the third blog in a series covering climate security. In this series we investigate the role of climate change as a causative factor and threat-multiplier in conflict, and the natural environment as a victim of conflict. In the previous two blogs we examined the impact of climate on the conflict in Darfur, and the way drought has shaped the Syrian civil war.

Climate Security and Myanmar

This blog will explore the climate-conflict nexus in the context of the ongoing military-civilian engagements in Myanmar, particularly in the rural Rakhine state. For years, the inhabitants of Rakhine State have faced violent persecution at the hands of the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar military), resulting in the displacement of thousands to neighbouring Bangladesh, where further humanitarian crises ensue. This case presents novel dynamics of climate security, with environmental abuse shaping conflict direction and nature, whilst climate change and natural resource exploitation serve the continuation and expansion of a humanitarian crisis. Since 2019, the ICC have been investigating the situation in Bangladesh and Myanmar. This piece will demonstrate the necessity of a climate security approach to its understanding, and in formulating an effective response.

Environmental abuse shaping conflict direction and nature

For decades Myanmar’s military has ruled with an iron fist, regularly employing violence in crimes against civilians. In 2021 power was seized from a (largely) democratically elected government and handed to the Tatmadaw, who rule with no accountability or restraint. Over the last nine years, the Rohingya people of western Rakhine state have fallen victim to persecution at the hands of the Tatmadaw and other unofficial armed groups.  This conflict has seen atrocities and crimes against humanity, including murder; imprisonment; enforced disappearance; torture; rape; sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence; persecution; enslavement; extermination and deportation (Human Rights Council). As a result, every year hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have been displaced to neighbouring Bangladesh (UN Environment Programme).

In this conflict the extreme targeting of the Rohingya is evident. Media coverage and commentary on the crimes focusses almost entirely on the religious/ethnic aspect. However, it is also about money – fiscal motivations for natural resource extraction are also a ‘defining driver’ of the extreme violence (Guardian).

Whilst the Rohingya are victims of widespread racial and ethnic discrimination, the Tatmadaw’s displacement of Buddhist populations suggests that these financial incentives are important factors. Significant numbers of Buddhist smallholders have been expelled from their land in recent years, especially since 2012 when a new law opened the country to foreign investors with little restrictions on land acquisition. This same year, the 1963 Peasants Law, which had previously protected smallholders’ land rights, was annulled (Guardian). Millions of smallholders were displaced, creating a significant new subcategory of refugees. The frequent replacement of expelled communities by large-scale timber extraction and mining links is such that Myanmar is now losing more than a million acres of forest per year (Guardian).

A 2020 Amnesty International report into funding of the Tatmadaw linked fiscal gains from environmental exploitation with trends of military violence in Myanmar. A key contributor to the power of the Tatmadaw is their ability to access significant revenue in addition to their official budget. At the heart of this funding is Myanmar Economic Holdings Public Company Ltd (MEHL) – a vast business empire whose partners include Wanbao Mining, Jing Hpaw Aung Jade, Nilar Yoma Co., Myanmar POSCO Steel Company Ltd, and Myanmar POSCO C&C Company Ltd, the largest steel manufacturer in Myanmar (Amnesty). Rakhine state is rich in natural resources, including oil and gas, making it prime estate for resource extraction and providing more incentives for forcibly evicting the Rohingya, which has occurred on a massive scale (Human Rights Council). After expulsion, their habitat is often replaced by large-scale timber extraction and mining activity (Guardian).

As the second-most vulnerable country in the world to climate change effects, ongoing conflict and humanitarian crises in Myanmar are exacerbated by the previously identified role of climate change as a risk multiplier (OHCHR 2021). This aggravation is felt particularly in Rakhine state, hit by regular cyclones and flooding. Rakhine state’s exposure to the effects of extreme weather is heightened by ongoing and rapid deforestation, leaving the land increasingly exposed to storm surges. Deforestation is a particular point of discontent for the peoples of Rakhine state, fuelling conflict over the apparent prioritisation of financial pursuits over human and environmental protection. The Arakan Natural Resources Environmental Network (ANREN), an alliance of roughly 30 Rakhine civil society and environmental rights groups, demand the right to control the region’s natural resources (RFA). 

Climate changes and natural resource depletion extending humanitarian crisis

The world’s largest refugee settlement is in the south-eastern district of Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, which is currently home to over 1 million refugees… most are displaced Rohingya. The increasing influx of Rohingya refugees has had dire repercussions for the already vulnerable natural environment, home to threatened species and susceptible to erosion. Approximately 3-5 football fields of forest are being felled every day to accommodate refugee living needs. Low-growing plants are being constantly unearthed for firewood (UN Environment Programme). Important national and community forestry areas, which were already under significant pressure, have been further degraded, with timber and other products being rapidly exploited from critical biodiversity areas, such as the Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary, Humchari National Park and the Inani Protected Area (International Alert).

This natural resource extraction is leaving refugees further exposed to poor humanitarian conditions. The resources extracted play an important role in protecting landscape from the extreme weather events increasingly experienced due to climate change. As the atmosphere rises in temperature, it can hold more water – about 7% more for each additional degree of temperature – making extreme rainfall events much more frequent (UN Refugee Agency). Rapid deforestation exposes Cox’s Bazar and its inhabitants to these extreme storms. The unavailability of timber also poses a humanitarian risk to the refugees as they travel increasingly long distances to collect fuel; with greater distances travelled, increasing levels of sexual and gender-based violence take place (UN Refugee Agency). Low-growing shrubs previously served to protect waterways, reduce surface heat, slow runoff rainwater, and bind loose soils. Erosion triggered by their removal causes landslides and higher temperatures in the camp. Just two weeks before the landmark 2021 IPCC report on the climate crisis, more than 21,000 Rohingya refugees living in these camps were affected by flash floods and landslides, seeing nearly half the monthly rainfall for July fall in just 24 hours. Six people were killed and thousands had their homes destroyed (UN Refugee Agency).

The refugee influx also threatens the humanitarian conditions of neighbouring Bangladeshi communities, as mass deforestation undermines necessary resource access and natural protection from extreme weather events. Regular landslides pose a particular threat to downstream communities as  waterways and agricultural fields become increasingly polluted by sediments carried by runoff from the camp (UNEP).

These realities highlight the role of both environmental destruction and extreme weather caused by climate change in extending and shaping the humanitarian crisis affecting the Rohingya and claiming further victims beyond the direct scope of conflict.

Conclusion

The ICC has opened a situation to investigate the crimes against humanity in Myanmar. To appreciate the complete picture, the ICC should consider the role of the natural environment: How it helped to motivate and fund the crimes; how climate change and environmental destruction has exacerbated the harm. With this deeper understanding, the international community can be mor effective in preventing mass human rights violations in Myanmar and elsewhere.  

The nexus of Climate and Security in Syria

19.08.22

Bretton Stephenson (Climate Counsel Researcher)

This series of blog posts will seek to explore the nexus between climate change and global security challenges. By looking at recent conflicts and humanitarian crises, the international community can better understand what conditions spark violence, how the environment serves as a risk multiplier and plays a role in armed conflict, and how to best provide justice to the victims of atrocities.

Climate Security Reintroduction

As discussed in our previous blog post about Sudan (see below), Climate Security refers to the global and national security risks driven by climate change and environmental variability. As extreme weather events worsen and climate patterns change, existing social and economic issues are exacerbated. Climate change acts as a threat multiplier: climate variation and environmental change can alter the status-quo of communities who may already be struggling to survive. When these changes occur, resulting instability can amplify issues and promote conflict. In areas where people are especially vulnerable to climate change (such as agricultural communities or areas with poor infrastructure) the potential for conflict is particularly strong. This is the dynamic that has played out in Syria over the past decade.

Climate: an exacerbating factor in Syrian Civil War:

Beginning in 2011, the Syrian Civil War has claimed thousands of lives and continues to smolder as government forces confront opposition militias throughout the country. In looking to its roots, environmental phenomena have been widely recognized as major drivers of instability in pre-war Syria. While climate change and environmental degradation did not directly spark the Syrian Civil War, climate served as a catalyst for disrupting rural communities and amplifying political discord.

Before the Arab Spring in 2011, Syria was already experiencing significant wealth disparities and increasingly blatant inequities of privilege for many citizens (Brittanica). When President Bashar al-Assad attempted to liberalize the economy, economic policy changes clearly benefited those with ties to the regime. When Assad cut food, fuel, and water subsidies relied upon by agricultural communities, the urban poor and rural farmers alike were left behind economically. These policies rapidly increased food prices and worsened wealth inequality, sparking protests from those who could not afford necessities.

These economic policy decisions came in the wake of a devastating drought across the region. From 2006 to 2010, a sharp decrease in rainfall decimated rural agriculture and led to widespread poverty among agricultural communities. During this prolonged drought, decreased precipitation and rising temperatures resulted in mass desertification of arable land. 800,000 people lost their income and 85% of Syria’s livestock died as the result of fertile land and grazing areas disappearing. (DW) Crop yields similarly decreased by as much as 67%, forcing Syria to import grain. Grain prices subsequently doubled (PNAS) and livestock prices increased by 75% as herds were decimated.

In the midst of this agricultural crisis, 1.5 million rural workers were forced to migrate to urban areas in order to support themselves. (PNAS Sources 3, 4, 13). When these rural Syrians migrated to find new livelihoods, they were met with unemployment and poor infrastructure, all of which exacerbated existing unrest between migrants and urban Syrians. In this sense, climate change was a major driving factor of political unrest in Syria. The first major protest against socio-economic conditions occurred in the rural Dar’a province, an area particularly affected by drought and lost livelihoods. While this protest was brutally crushed by the government, the harsh crackdown from authorities sparked more protests throughout the country. As violent clashes between protestors and state authorities became more prominent in both rural and urban areas suffering from depleted agriculture and soaring prices, the situation devolved into war between state and non-state militias.

Environmental Destruction for Military Advantage

Not only did climate change play a major role in setting the stage for conflict, it also shaped the way the conflict played out. In addition to exacerbating socio-economic challenges prior to the war, water scarcity was a major driver of violence in the Syrian Civil War. The use of siege tactics to take control of enemy-held cities became even more popular due to dwindling water supplies throughout Syria. Based on reports, armed groups on nearly every side of the conflict utilized environmental resources in order to gain a military advantage. ISIS and the Syrian government both used water infrastructure in order to cut off cities from water supplies and cut off resistance (Geneva). In 2019 alone, 46 direct attacks were carried out on water facilities in Syria, including intentional contamination of water sources (UNICEF).

Siege tactics were not limited only to water resources. In Daraya and Madaya, the Syrian government and allied militias destroyed local food supplies by burning agricultural fields (Amnesty International). In the siege of Kefraya and Foua, Armed opposition groups (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement) unlawfully restricted and confiscated humanitarian aid and shelled agricultural fields in order to inflict additional stress on the population (Amnesty Int’l). In many more cities and villages throughout Syria, local water and power infrastructure was targeted by bombing and mortars in order to push citizens out.

The Natural Environment as a Victim

Over the last decade, the environment of Syria has itself become a victim of the war. As a result of intentional and collateral damage to soil, air, and water resources, the conflict's impacts will be felt far beyond any ceasefire. Direct attacks on water infrastructure and indirect impacts from bombardments have left much of the country’s infrastructure inoperable. The shelling of industrial operations throughout the past decade released hazardous chemicals, contaminating groundwater and agricultural land (Baba et al.). Chemical weapons and explosives used in violation of international law have further contaminated groundwater and soil, and these chemicals are expected to persist in the ground. This contamination of land and water has obstructed agriculture, exacerbating a food shortage and struggling healthcare system. Combined with a life threatening water shortage in Syria, current environmental conditions resemble those that sparked the Civil War. 

In such a precarious position, additional environmental damage could further destabilize the country. Indeed, deforestation and environmental destruction continue to threaten security for all Syrians. Throughout the war, aerial bombardment of forest cover used to shield troops and supplies has led to fires and deforestation (Ali Mohammad). In 2018, Turkish-backed militias reportedly cut down 500,000 olive trees and burned fields after displacing Syrian landowners (NPA). It is unclear if such tactics were part of looting or a more focused military strategy on disrupting economic activity which could potentially benefit extremist groups, but the impact is the same. As internal displacement perpetuates, deforestation has accelerated. Remaining forest land has been converted into urban land in order to house displaced people, limiting already scarce environmental resources in Syria and making adaptation to climate change more difficult.

With violence smoldering across the country and a pervasive global pandemic ever-present, 2021 also presented Syria with its worst drought in modern history. Water scarcity and food insecurity are both more intense now than even before the war began. Agricultural land was seriously damaged during the war, resulting in wheat production falling by more than half from 2020 to 2021 (IRC). Syria now relies on imported wheat, further inflating food costs and threatening instability.

Looking Ahead:

If international organizations and authorities want to remain relevant in the coming century, specific attention must be paid to the nexus between conflict and climate change. The issue of climate security should be expected to grow as climate variability increases and extreme weather events become more common. As precipitation becomes more extreme and desertification increases across the globe, climate change will promote social instability and unrest in the most vulnerable areas. The resulting movement of people and traditional hierarchies will result in more frequent and more intense political violence. This process will replicate itself most evidently in areas with weaker political institutions and more variable climates, but repercussions will be felt across the entire globe. Climate change will impact national security in every region of the world, and states must confront that reality.

International criminal law can be a tool for addressing misconduct which worsens environmental issues and promotes instability, but that requires a dedicated focus from the legal community. Unfortunately, international institutions have failed to consider these climate security issues in recent years. The UN Security Council recently failed to pass a resolution which would have incorporated climate security considerations in conflict prevention strategies (UN). SImilarly, the Office of the Prosecutor’s 2016 promise to “give particular consideration to prosecuting” environmental crimes has gone largely unfulfilled. To date, no ICC prosecution of intentional environmental destruction has occurred. Of course, none of the core states involved in the Syrian Civil War are parties to the Rome Statute. However, it seems unlikely that even Rome Statute signatories would face scrutiny for the same kinds of environmental destruction which have occurred in Syria.

When conflict does emerge, environmental destruction is usually an overlooked element which drives humanitarian and economic costs beyond any cease-fire or resolution. Beyond a lack of prosecutorial attention, existing international law is ambiguous on what damage meets the threshold to be considered a war crime. Even with a wealth of evidence, the lack of jurisprudence presents an additional challenge to prosecutors wishing to provide justice for victims of environmental destruction. Incorporating an international law of Ecocide would provide prosecutors an additional tool for bringing perpetrators to justice, and could be done without the ambiguity of existing Rome Statute language (see Article 8.2(b)(iv)). As climate change worsens, environmental destruction will become more pervasive and harder to rectify. International institutions and criminal law must take Climate Security seriously in order to provide paths for accountability and meet the challenges of our rapidly changing world.

Climate Security and Sudan

22.06.22

Richard J Rogers, Bretton Stephenson, George Corr

This series of blog posts will seek to explore the nexus between climate change and global security challenges. By looking at recent conflicts and humanitarian crises, the international community can better understand what conditions spark violence, how the environment serves as a risk multiplier and plays a role in armed conflict, and how to best provide justice to the victims of atrocities. This first post uses Sudan as a case study.

Climate Security: An Introduction

Climate security refers to the relationship between changes in climate patterns and global conflicts. As discussed here, Climate Security can refer to both the security challenges posed by climate variability as well as the changing environmental conditions across the globe which shape violence and negatively impact humanitarian conditions. As our earth warms, weather patterns and temperatures are becoming increasingly unusual and unpredictable. States across the globe are experiencing more extreme temperatures, severe changes in precipitation, volatile weather patterns, and an increased likelihood of natural disasters. These phenomena are not uniform, but can be expected to have a deleterious effect on people and institutions across borders. Regardless of the specific local dynamics, global climate change will continue to multiply social and economic risks, making agriculture more difficult and resources more scarce.

As United Nations Development Program Administrator Achim Steiner has explained “Climate change is a risk multiplier. It aggravates already fragile situations, including in humanitarian contexts where communities have limited capacity to cope with additional shocks.” Climate variability and environmental degradation have the strongest destabilizing effects for communities which are already facing existential threats. Especially for people of low socio-economic status, changes in climate or land quality can dramatically impact how they make their living, how they feed their family, and whether they survive the next social unrest or bad harvest. Rural agricultural communities, facing poor access to infrastructure and support, may be especially vulnerable to changing climates.

This web of relationships between people, institutions, and the natural environment is often where conflict arises. As people become increasingly desperate and traditional societal roles are altered, those who feel threatened will more readily turn to violence. While climate change may not always be a direct cause of socio-economic pressures, environmental volatility will multiply pre-existing threats which make people more likely to turn to violence and armed conflict.

This violence and conflict can swell over time and may lead to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Therefore, climate security is a crucial framework to understand the context of the ICC’s existing caseload. As we will see, climate-related factors have been a cause, feature, and/or effect of the vast majority of situations currently under investigation by the ICC and should be factored-into the ICC’s work. Understanding this dynamic will better prepare the global legal community for the increasingly climate-affected future.

Sudan: A Case Study

In 2007, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called the war in Darfur “the world’s first Climate Change Conflict” which “began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.” Darfur thus presents a particularly strong example of how climate can multiply security threats and initiate conflict shaped by changes in the natural environment. Formally beginning in 2003, the ethnic cleansing of Darfur’s non-Arab population was the culmination of growing tension between Arabs and ethnic minorities as fields dried and cattle grazed. It was these relationships, shaped by the natural environment, which would turn violent and result in genocide and displacement of over 2.5 million people (Reuters).

Much of Sudan’s land area is part of the Sahel, the barrier between the Sahara Desert and tropical savanna. The Sahel stretches beneath the entire width of the Sahara, from Mauritania to eastern Sudan. Because of the high average temperature and variability in plant cover between parts of the Sahel, nomadic livestock herding has long been the traditional lifestyle for many people in the region. Unfortunately, the entire Sahel region has undergone one of the most dramatic transformations of any environmental region in the world for the past several decades. Extreme drying and higher temperatures have caused natural desertification, transforming kilometers of grassland into desert every year.

Darfur has been no stranger to this phenomenon. Making up the westernmost portion of Sudan, Darfur is a large area spread across a variety of desert, plains, and mountainous terrain. Because of its geographical distance from major urban centers and its highly variable precipitation, Darfur’s population relied mainly on subsistence agriculture and tribal connections for much of recent history, along with the traditional nomadic herding lifestyle of most Sahelian cultures. Between 1967 and 2007, total annual rainfall in Darfur fell by 30 percent, accompanied by the southern expansion of the Sahara by over a mile every year. Drought, flash floods, and extreme heat have become increasingly common, leading to widespread losses of traditionally arable land. While not the sole cause of the war in Darfur, these environmental changes were key to sparking conflict initially and continue to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. As noted by Human Rights Watch, the combination of “extended drought; competition for dwindling resources; the lack of good governance and democracy; and easy availability of guns” ultimately led to politicized violence and the horrific war that continues through today.

As the Sahara expanded, traditionally agricultural and nomadic communities alike were unsettled and pushed further onto less productive lands. This dynamic soon led to conflict between nomadic herding groups and stationary agricultural communities. Nomadic herders, who were predominantly Arab, drove their cattle through new areas and more sensitive agricultural lands. Most of the settled agriculture in Darfur was carried out by ethnic African farmers such as the Fur and Masalit. These subsistence farmers were already economically vulnerable, but drought and infertile land began to worsen the food insecurity of communities in West Darfur. Rapid desertification and increasingly severe droughts made supporting agriculture and grazing cattle more difficult, in turn leading to disputes over where cattle could graze and threatening the position of Arab herders. As written by Ban Ki-moon, “it is no accident that the violence in Darfur erupted during the drought.” When pastures and transhumance routes began to shrink and grassland turned to desert, traditional dispute-resolution systems were unable to keep up (UN WFP). Over several years, communities became increasingly desperate to maintain their way of life.

Conflict was most violent in West Darfur, where multiple severe droughts facilitated repeated confrontations. In 1998 and 1999, Mimi Arab herders began moving south with their herds earlier than usual as a result of diminished rains over the winter (HRW). This movement pushed into sensitive agricultural land, which itself lacked enough water to productively grow crops. When Mimis challenged the land ownership legitimacy of the Masalit community, the situation turned violent. Ethnic cleavages were exacerbated as water and other resources dwindled, leading to more desperate situations for all parties. Violence between African ethnic groups and Arabs steadily increased, with the Sudanese government stepping in to fund Arab Janjaweed militias and targeting civilians in 2003. From this point on, the Sudanese government aimed its sights on the ethnic cleansing of Darfur, resulting in the international crimes currently under investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC.

In addition to prolonged drought and resource scarcity, unrest between herders and farmers was exacerbated by shortages of land at the hands of government policies. Beginning even before the war in Darfur, the Sudanese government was notorious for its “land-grabbing” from citizens. Between 2004 and 2013 (during the height of violence in Sudan) roughly four million hectares of land was forcibly redistributed by the government to local and foreign investors. Under the Unregistered Land Act of 1970 and the Civil Transaction Act of 1984, justice ministers were able to transfer unregistered land to the government and deploy security forces to defend this land. This was used to acquire unregistered lands in Darfur without providing citizens a recourse in courts for forceful eviction.

Because most of the land used in Darfur was utilized by ethnic African farmers, the grabbing of this land by the government dispossessed these communities of the most productive soil. Such scarcity of arable land made sedentary communities more desperate in their attempt to fence in land and pushed other minority communities to the brink, resulting in subsequent violent reactions. As the practice of land-grabbing continues in Sudan, the scarcity of land is certain to have other socio-economic impacts. As food insecurity is at its highest among refugees and displaced people, diminishing arable land will only worsen unrest in the country and inflame existing disparities for non-Arab minorities.

In 2021 alone, continuing conflict in Darfur displaced over 430,000 more people (Reuters). Sudan continues to be plagued by conflict and worsening environmental conditions, with an estimated 40 million people needing immediate humanitarian assistance to address severe droughts, flash floods, and rampant food insecurity. Environmental issues are not the sole cause of suffering in Sudan, but they continue to multiply latent threats of food insecurity, medical shortage, and economic disparity. Armed conflict makes these issues harder to address, and climate change will continue to exacerbate the threats to displaced and stable Sudanese communities alike.

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From a global security perspective, understanding the web of rural pastoral and sedentary relationships in Sudan shows us that conflict is not merely the result of ethnic identity or land dispossession. Instead, the war in Darfur stemmed from a range of factors, with climate change multiplying the existing ethnic cleavage, dispossession, and economic vulnerability of rural communities. Climate change facilitated environmental degradation, which in turn made altercations between groups more frequent and more charged as livelihoods were threatened. We have seen a similar dynamic occur across the Sahel, where violence has flourished as the Sahara expands into Mali, Niger, and Chad. The situation across the Sahel will continue to deteriorate, and we must be prepared to witness the same crises on an even wider scale.

International criminal law can provide justice for those who suffered as a result of the war in Darfur and elsewhere, but we must first understand the full picture of what occurred. The ICC has six currently pending cases against Sudanese government leaders, and the OTP continues to investigate genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed during the ethnic-cleansing of non-Arab minorities in Darfur. In order to understand these crimes, the international legal community must consider the environmental components and continue to draw connections between climate change and conflict. Lessons learned from the war in Darfur can illuminate the key dynamics that multiply threats in a warming world. Across regions and extreme weather events, these stressors can be expected to become more common and more severe. If the international community wants to prevent or mitigate the violent impacts of climate change, we must work to develop climate security and more urgently search for solutions that protect vulnerable communities.